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ANALOGY IN AQUINAS: THE ALSTON-
WOLTERSTORFF DEBATE REVISITED
Joshua Lee Harris
In the last decade there arose a debate between William P. Alston and Nicholas 
Wolterstorff on the subject of Thomas Aquinas’s doctrine of analogia—that 
is, the position that perfection terms, when properly predicated of God and 
of creatures, are distinct, yet related in meaning. Whereas Alston interprets 
Aquinas to hold this well-known position before criticizing it, Wolterstorff 
argues that Aquinas actually did not hold the position as it is usually pre-
sented. In this paper, I show why Alston’s “orthodox” interpretation is more 
faithful to the letter of Aquinas’s text than is Wolterstorff’s “heterodoxy” and 
attempt to defuse Alston’s criticisms.
Scholars of Thomas Aquinas often bemoan what they perceive to be 
anachronistic tendencies of contemporary analytic interpreters of the 
Latin Doctor’s work.1 This is especially true with respect to semantic and 
metaphysical issues, since the answers affirmed by Aquinas, the mode of 
questioning, and indeed even the subject matter under which such ques-
tions and answers are said to belong often differ significantly from their 
correlates in contemporary analytic philosophy. This is to be expected, of 
course, since precious few contemporary philosophers have both the in-
terest and opportunity to obtain fluency in the “conceptual grammars” of 
both Scholastic and analytic metaphysics.
In the last decade, however, there arose a debate amongst two promi-
nent analytic philosophers of religion that bucked this anachronistic 
trend, and exemplified this “bilingual” fluency to an impressive extent. 
These two philosophers are William P. Alston and Nicholas Wolterstorff, 
and their debate concerned the interpretation of one of the most contro-
versial and difficult areas of Aquinas’s philosophical theology: namely, 
the doctrine of analogia as espoused in Summa theologiae 1.13.5 and Summa 
contra Gentiles I.32, among other texts.2 As is almost universally accepted 
1For some particularly notable examples of this phenomenon, see Klima, “On Kenny on 
Aquinas on Being,” 567–580; Long, “Aquinas on Being and Logicism,” 323–347; Dewan, “Saint 
Thomas, Alvin Plantinga, and the Divine Simplicity,” 141–151. 
2See also Aquinas, I Sent. 19.5.2, ad 1; I Sent 35.1.4; De Veritate 2.11; De potentia Dei 7.7; 
Summa Contra Gentiles I.34. 
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by readers of Aquinas, the central contention of the doctrine of analogia 
is that the meanings of perfection terms as applied to God and to crea-
tures are neither purely “univocal” (i.e., identical in meaning), nor purely 
“equivocal” (completely distinct in meaning), but “analogical” (distinct, 
but related in meaning).3
The Alston-Wolterstorff debate consists of three separate essays: (1) 
Alston’s “Aquinas on Theological Predication: A Look Backward and 
a Look Forward”; (2) Wolterstorff’s reply, “Alston on Aquinas on Theo-
logical Predication”; and finally (3) Alston’s “Response to Wolterstorff.”4 
Although both philosophers reject Aquinas’s closely related doctrine of 
divine simplicity, their most fundamental disagreement is about whether 
these texts from Aquinas allow for at least some sort of univocity when it 
comes to predicating perfections of God and creatures. Representing the 
“orthodox” position is Alston, who finds Aquinas’s doctrine of analogia 
wanting precisely because it does not allow for any such univocal predica-
tion. Wolterstorff, however, affirms a “heterodox” position, holding that 
Aquinas’s doctrine of analogia does, in fact, allow for a sort of metaphysical 
or “real” univocity in the res significata (i.e., a real identity of the referents 
of perfection terms) between God and creatures. Consequently, according 
to Wolterstorff, even if Alston is right to have reservations about any 
position that would deny univocity outright, his rejection of Aquinas’s 
doctrine of analogia is premature.
In what follows, I revisit this debate and aim to further it in two 
ways—one interpretive, and the other systematic. First, I show why 
Alston’s orthodox interpretation of analogia is more faithful to the letter of 
Aquinas’s text than is Wolterstorff’s heterodoxy. Second, I attempt to de-
fuse Alston’s criticisms of this orthodox position. My argument proceeds 
in four major sections: a brief account of the main distinctions operative 
in Aquinas’s doctrine of analogia (§1); a summary of the most important 
differences between Alston’s orthodoxy and Wolterstorff’s heterodoxy 
(§2); a refutation of Wolterstorff’s heterodoxy (§3); and finally a response 
to Alston’s concerns regarding the viability of Aquinas’s rejection of 
any and all univocity between perfections as exemplified by God and 
creatures (§4).
1. Aquinas and Analogy
First, a rundown of the basics of analogy in Aquinas. As both Alston and 
Wolterstorff acknowledge, this doctrine in Aquinas is the source of a mind-
boggling amount of controversy in secondary literature.5 This controversy 
3As we will have the occasion to revisit later in this essay, this is more or less a standard 
interpretation of the mentioned. See Aquinas, Summa theologiae (McCabe translation), 1.13.5. 
4Alston, “Aquinas on Theological Predication,” 145–178; Wolterstorff, “Alston on Aquinas 
on Theological Predication,” 209–228; Alston, “Response to Wolterstorff,” 229–236.
5For a good summary and analysis of this debate in the secondary literature on analogy, 
see Hochschild, “Proportionality and Divine Naming,” 531–558. 
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is often about what sort of analogy best captures the way in which the 
meanings of terms predicated of God and creatures are distinct, yet related, 
but the disputes extend much further than that—even into some of its most 
basic claims. So, although the purposes of the present argument are not 
well served by delving deeply into this secondary literature, it is necessary 
to establish some of the most fundamental distinctions at play if only to set 
the context for the Alston-Wolterstorff debate.
The first relevant distinction—or set of distinctions, rather—which is 
immediately necessary to posit is the so-called “semantic triangle” of 
Aristotle’s Peri Hermeneias. This semantic triangle, which “set[s] the stage 
for all semantic considerations in the Middle Ages,”6 is made up of three 
fundamental constituents: name (nomen), concept (ratio) and thing (res). 
For Aquinas, names signify things, but, crucially, this signification is only 
possible through the mediation of concepts. As Aquinas remarks in his 
Commentary on the Peri Hermeneias,
[Names] cannot immediately signify things, as is clear from the mode of 
signifying, for the name “man” signifies human nature in abstraction from 
singulars; hence it is impossible that it immediately signify a singular man. 
The Platonists for this reason held that it signified the separated idea of man. 
But because in Aristotle’s teaching man in the abstract does not really sub-
sist, but is only in the mind, it was necessary for Aristotle to say that vocal 
sounds signify the conceptions of the intellect immediately and things by 
means of them.7
To be clear, Aquinas’s position is that names (or predicates) signify con-
cepts immediately, and things by mediation, i.e., through concepts. Note 
the anti-Platonism in this passage. If language simply “mirrored” reality 
in a sort of straightforward, isomorphic relation (i.e., predicate F : property 
F :: predicate G : property G),8 then there would be no need for concepts; 
for one could simply assume that all names employed in true propositions 
would have to simply “map on” to reality in a “one-to-one” way.
This is simply not the case for Aquinas. In a decidedly anti-Platonist 
vein that is typical of his corpus as a whole, Aquinas rejects any semblance 
of a doctrine of subsisting universals. The ratio through which we know 
res plays an extremely important role in meaningful language, since it is 
the peculiar capacity of the intellect to abstract universal concepts from 
particular things.9 Following Avicenna, Aquinas remarks in his early work 
De ente et essentia that “common natures” are “neither one nor many”—
meaning that whatever is expressed by predicates such as “human” is, 
in itself, neither universal nor particular. Rather, universality and par-
6Klima, “The Semantic Principles Underlying Saint Thomas Aquinas’s Metaphysics of 
Being,” 90. 
7Aquinas, Expositio libri Peryermeneias, I.2.5. 
8There is reason to believe that this “mirroring” relationship informs (mistakenly, in my 
view) Alston’s reading of Aquinas. See Alston, “Aquinas on Theological Predication,” 163n. 
9See Aquinas, On Being and Essence, 47. 
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ticularity are added to the nature. A common nature is universal insofar 
as it is abstracted by the agent intellect as a concept; a common nature is 
particular insofar as it is exemplified as a really (i.e., extra-mentally) ex-
isting substance.10
Thus, returning to the Summa theologiae, we learn that “words are 
referred to things signified (res significata) through the medium of the intel-
lectual conception. It follows therefore that we can give a name to anything 
in as far as we can understand it.”11 In short, meaningful language is lan-
guage we can understand, and we understand by way of concepts. This 
will prove to be an important point for the debate between Alston and 
Wolterstorff.
For now, it is enough to see that the “triangular” Aristotelian semantic 
framework (nomen-ratio-res) offers us insight into a distinction which is 
important for the debate: namely, the distinction between the modus sig-
nificandi and the res significata. The res significata is the “thing signified,” 
i.e., the reality to which certain predicates in a proposition are ultimately 
referred.12 The modus significandi, on the other hand, is the “mode of 
signifying,” which accounts for the intellectual act of “dividing and com-
posing” subjects and predicates into propositions. As Aquinas remarks 
in Summa contra Gentiles I.32, “by means of a name we express things in 
the way in which the intellect conceives them. For our intellect . . . does 
not transcend the mode which is found in sensible things, in which the 
form and the subject of the form are not identical owing to the composi-
tion of form and matter.”13 At least two points are important here: (1) the 
modus significandi is tied inextricably to our way of understanding; and (2) 
this way of understanding is marked by our capacity for the composition 
of subject and predicate. The non-identity of subject and predicate is a 
necessary condition for our modus significandi, since it is the composition of 
subject and predicate that yields meaningful propositions.14 If subject and 
predicate were not distinct, then they would be identical and, of course, 
then they would not be composite at all.
In short, we signify in accordance with how we understand, and we un-
derstand by way of composition. Yet for Aquinas it is a non-negotiable fact 
that God is simple and therefore not composite in any way.15 In forming 
propositions about God, we understand him as composite—not because 
10See Owens, “Common Nature,” 1–14. 
11Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1.13.1 (my emphasis). 
12It should be remembered, however, that not all concepts point beyond themselves to 
an existing res. So-called “second intentions” such as “genus” and “species,” for example, 
merely denote “beings of reason” (entia rationis). See Klima, “The Semantic Principles Under-
lying Saint Thomas Aquinas’s Metaphysics of Being,” 102. 
13Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, I.32. 
14This is not strictly speaking correct, since identity itself is an analogical term, but the 
identity that I am excluding from the nature of propositions is absolute identity (i.e., the ex-
clusion of any and all distinction). 
15See Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1.3.7. 
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we mistakenly “choose” to do so, but because we cannot understand in 
any other way. After all, propositions just are compositions of subject and 
predicate. For this reason, regardless of which predicates we use to de-
scribe God, it is already the case that our modus significandi will always fail 
to represent what and/or how God is in himself.
But this raises a question that leads us to the next important distinction: 
namely, the distinction between literal (proprie) and metaphorical (meta-
phorice) speech about God. If it is true that our modus significandi cannot 
represent the way in which God is in himself, must it follow that our speech 
about God must always be metaphorical? As Alston and Wolterstorff both 
recognize, Aquinas’s answer is in the negative: “not all names are applied 
to God in a metaphorical sense, but there are some which are said of Him 
in their literal sense.”16
For Aquinas, the proprie-metaphorice distinction is founded in the thing 
signified, not in the mode of signifying. If the thing signified includes im-
perfection by virtue of what it is, then that thing when predicated of God is 
metaphorical. One of Aquinas’s favorite examples of a metaphorical state-
ment about God is the proposition, “God is a lion.” Because the essence 
of lion includes corporeality—an imperfection17—the proposition ascribes 
an imperfection to God. Therefore the proposition is metaphorical.
Yet, Aquinas argues, some names express perfections themselves 
without any reference to imperfection at all: “Other names, however, 
express these perfections absolutely, without any such mode of participa-
tion being part of their signification as the words ‘being,’ ‘good,’ ‘living,’ 
and the like, and such names can be literally (proprie) applied to God.”18 
Because perfections such as goodness, life, etc. do not include any imper-
fection per se, there is nothing to prevent us from ascribing them to God 
non-metaphorically. That is to say, these predicates express something 
true about God in a straightforward and non-metaphorical manner. Still, 
Aquinas qualifies this position by resorting to the distinction between 
modus significandi and res significata:
[O]ur intellect apprehends [these perfections] as they are in creatures, and 
it signifies them by names as it apprehends them. Therefore as to the names 
applied to God—viz. the perfections which they signify, such as goodness, 
life and the like, and their mode of signification. As regards what is signified 
by these names, they belong properly to God, and more properly than they 
belong to creatures, and are applied primarily to Him. But as regards their 
mode of signification, they do not properly and strictly apply to God; for 
their mode of signification applies to creatures.19
16Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1.13.3.
17In Aquinas’s Aristotelian metaphysics, matter is defined as potency (and therefore im-
perfection) with respect to form. See Aquinas, De principiis naturae, 2. 
18Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1.13.3, ad 1. 
19Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1.13.3.
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This is an important passage because it reveals how Aquinas is thinking 
about properly literal, analogical language about God. Perfections such 
as goodness and life are predicated literally of God, but it is important to 
note that these perfections are only understood to a limited degree. That 
is, because our modus significandi is irreducibly composite and therefore 
inadequate to the task of representing God as he is in himself, it is also the 
case that it is inadequate to the task of grasping divine perfections as they 
are in themselves. After all, on Aquinas’s doctrine of divine simplicity, we 
know that whatever is predicated literally of God is simply identical with 
God. Goodness, life and the like are ultimately expressions of the divine 
essence itself. To the extent that we fail to comprehend the divine essence, 
then, we also fail to comprehend these divine perfections.
But this conclusion raises a further question, which leads us to the third 
and final (for the purposes of this section) distinction that is operative in 
Aquinas’s doctrine of analogia: namely, the distinction between a “non-
univocal” agent cause and its effect. If it is true that there are certain terms 
which signify the very perfections that are really in the divine essence, 
could it not be the case that it is only our concepts that are analogical, as 
opposed to the things signified? That is, do God and creatures exemplify 
the same perfections, but to varying degrees? As we will see, the answers 
to these questions constitute the most important disagreement between 
Alston and Wolterstorff. In order to arrive at Aquinas’s position on the 
matter, we must make recourse to the concept of non-univocal causality.
In Summa theologiae 1.13.5, Aquinas remarks that “whatever is [lit-
erally] said of God and creatures, is said according to the relation of a 
creature to God as its principle and cause, in whom the perfections of 
things pre-exist excellently.”20 Here we have a direct connection between 
the rationale for the doctrine of analogia and God’s role as the causal prin-
ciple of all created being. That is to say, perfections are predicated of God 
and creatures analogously because God is the first cause and principle of 
created being. In order to find out why this is the case, we have to make 
recourse to the notion of non-univocal agency; for it is because God is the 
non-univocal agent cause of creation that our language about him is also 
non-univocal.
The concept of a non-univocal agent comes from Summa theologiae 
1.4.3—the context being Aquinas’s affirmative answer to the question of 
“whether creatures can be like God.” Having established that all created 
perfections are participations of the divine simplicity in the previous 
article,21 1.4.3 is attempt to show how this is the case.
Creatures are “like God,” for Aquinas, if and only if they bear a formal 
“similitude” (similitudo) to the divine essence: “Since similitude is based 
upon agreement or communication in form, it varies according to the 
20Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1.13.5.
21See Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1.4.2. 
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many modes of communicating form.”22 Aquinas distinguishes three such 
“modes of communicating form (modi communicandi in forma)”:
1. Causes which communicate to their effects “the same formality” in 
equal measure, as in the case of “two things equally white.”23
2. Causes which communicate to their effects “the same formality, 
though not according to the same measure, but according to more or 
less,” as in the case of “something less white [that] is said to be like 
another thing more white.”24
3. Causes which communicate to their effects “the same form, but not 
according to the same formality,” as in the case of “non-univocal 
agents.”25
Note that (1) and (2) involve a qualititative sameness which is also subject 
to quantitative relation. In this case, the quality is “white” and the quantita-
tive relations are “equal” (1), “more” and “less” (2). According to divine 
simplicity, however, there are no accidents in God, and thus no qualities 
or quantitative relations of any kind.26 Therefore (1) and (2) are ruled out 
immediately as candidates for the way in which God communicates his 
perfection to creatures as first cause.27
This leaves (3), which is precisely how Aquinas conceives of the way 
in which creatures bear a similitude to God: namely, as effects of a non-
univocal agent cause:
If, however, the agent and its effect are not contained in the same species, 
there will be a similitude, but not according to the formality of the same spe-
cies; as things generated by the sun’s heat may be in some sort spoken of as 
like the sun, not as though they received the form of the sun in its specific 
similitude, but in its generic similitude.28
If the earthly effects of the sun’s heat (e.g., plants, animals, etc.) bore a 
specific similitude to the sun, then these effects would not be earthly at all; 
for then they would be “little suns” themselves. This is not the case. In-
stead, the sun’s heat is participated in by earthly creatures in diverse and 
manifold ways in accordance with the various essences of those creatures. 
This is a generic—not a specific—similitude, and therefore the sun is rightly 
called a non-univocal agent cause of its earthly effects. In short, unlike 
univocal agents, the sun does not “reproduce itself” in its effects formally, 
i.e., in accordance with its species.
22Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1.4.3. 
23Aquinas, Summa theologiae 
24Aquinas, Summa theologiae
25Aquinas, Summa theologiae
26See Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1.3.6. 
27As we will see something like (2) is exactly what Wolterstorff sees (mistakenly, in my 
view) in Aquinas’s doctrine of analogia. 
28Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1.4.3. 
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Like the sun with respect to the earthly creatures it generates, God is 
the non-univocal cause of creatures. Yet, crucially, there is another “nega-
tive step” to take in order to fully appreciate the way in which creatures 
are like God; for unlike the case of the sun, God has no generic similitude 
to communicate because he is not contained in any genus at all.29 So, while 
the example of the sun is helpful for explaining how a non-univocal agent 
differs from a univocal agent, it fails in this important, but unavoidable 
way. This failure is important because it signals the fact that God’s com-
munication of similitude has absolutely no adequate parallel in the created 
order. As Aquinas remarks, the effects of this sort of non-univocal agency 
“will still more distantly reproduce the form of the agent, not, that is, so as 
to participate in the similitude of the agent’s form according to the same 
specific or generic formality, but only according to some sort of analogy; 
as existence is common to all.”30 What this means is that the similitude of 
creatures with respect to God is itself only analogically related to the sort 
of generic similitude that is on display in the example of earthly creatures 
and the sun. This recognition pertains to what Joshua Hochschild calls the 
“formal structure” of the doctrine of analogia entis in Aquinas: namely, that 
creature-Creator similitude is itself different-but-related to all other forms 
of similitude.31 As Alston rightly maintains, for Aquinas there is simply no 
“getting below the proportional similarity so as to specify features that are 
wholly in common.”32
To recap, then, we have touched upon three important points of consid-
eration on the subject of analogia in Aquinas:
1. On Aquinas’s Aristotelian semantics, meaningful language is con-
stituted by the “triangle” of names, concepts and things. We can 
only understand—and therefore speak meaningfully about—things 
through the human intellective process of concept formation. Thus, 
there is a distinction between the res significata and the modus signifi-
candi.
2. Aquinas admits that some terms are predicated of God and crea-
tures literally (proprie) as opposed to metaphorically (metaphorice), 
but this literal-metaphorical distinction is founded in the res signifi-
cata, not the modus significandi. Only perfection terms—that is, those 
terms which designate immaterial perfections such as goodness, 
life, etc.—are predicated literally of God.
3. God is the cause of all created being, and as such he communicates 
his perfections to the created order in the mode of a non-univocal 
29See Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1.3.5.
30Aquinas, Summa theologiae. 1.4.3. 
31The (four-term) analogy of proportionalitas is used in De veritate 2.11 to express this rela-
tion of similitudes. On this point, see Hochschild, “Proportionality and Divine Naming,” 
556–557.
32Alston, “Aquinas on Theological Predication,” 153. 
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agent. Thus, created perfections themselves bear an irreducibly ana-
logical similitude to the divine simplicity in which they participate.
Having considered these three points, we are in a position to gain a fuller 
understanding of Aquinas’s famous position:
[W]hatever is said of God and creatures, is said according to the relation of a 
creature to God as its principle and cause, wherein all perfections of things 
pre-exist excellently. Now this mode of community of idea is a mean be-
tween pure equivocation and simple univocation. For in analogies the idea 
is not, as it is in univocals, one and the same, yet it is not totally diverse as 
in equivocals; but a term which is thus used in a multiple sense signifies 
various proportions to some one thing.33
Since the human modus significandi is irreducibly composite in that it 
generates meaning only by composing subject and predicate into proposi-
tions, it is impossible even in principle for human creatures to represent 
the divine simplicity in the way that he is in himself. We can speak truly 
about God, however, because the creaturely perfections we do under-
stand are effects of his non-univocal agency. Indeed, Aquinas’s semantic 
doctrine of analogous predication is founded ultimately in his correlative 
metaphysical doctrine of analogous similitude (i.e., the similitude between 
a non-univocal agent and its effect).
2. The Alston-Wolterstorff Debate
Alston correctly recognizes that Aquinas holds that words only signify 
through concepts with which human intellects compose propositions, and 
that “the differences between God and creatures that prevent univocity, 
stem from one basic divine attribute—simplicity.”34 He also correctly 
recognizes that the doctrine of analogia as developed in Summa theologiae 
1.13.5 and Summa contra Gentiles I.32 has “causal or ontological” and “se-
mantic” aspects. He remarks that this doctrine “holds that such terms are 
predicated of God in a sense not exactly the same as that in which they 
are predicated of creatures but in a sense that is related to the latter by 
virtue of the dependence of creatures on God for their existence and what 
they are.”35
Created perfections are always accidents added to finite essences. 
More precisely, they are qualitative accidents, meaning that they are modi-
fications of composite substances in motion.36 Thus, perfections such as 
goodness are, in a sense, imperfect insofar as they are qualities inhering 
in complex substances such as Socrates. In the creaturely case, the modus 
significandi is adequate to the task of representing the perfection without 
ambiguity, since the perfection involved can be mapped onto the subject-
33Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1.13.5. 
34Alston, “Aquinas on Theological Predication,” 148. 
35Alston, “Aquinas on Theological Predication,” 160. 
36See Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 5.16.998. 
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predicate structure of that modus significandi. Citing Summa contra Gentiles 
I.32.3, again, Alston rightly claims that for Aquinas there can be no such 
univocity when predicating the same perfection terms of God, since in this 
case “[t]here can be no exact reproduction of form just because creatures 
have in a divided way what is found in God in an absolutely simple way, 
without any real distinction.”37
Alston concludes his summary of the Thomistic position with the fol-
lowing account of what we are doing when we speak literally about God: 
“We can adumbrate the analogous divine perfection only by relating it, 
by supereminence, to the creaturely version of which we do have a sat-
isfactory grasp.”38 In other words, the lack of univocity is not limited to 
the modus significandi; rather, it extends into the res significata itself, thus 
disallowing any conceptual refinement that might “correct” the “merely 
analogical” application of perfection terms to God.39 All this to say, Alston 
seems to sign off on all three aforementioned points about analogia as part 
of the proper reading of Aquinas: (1) we can speak meaningfully about 
God only in and through our concepts; (2) we can predicate perfection 
terms of God literally; and finally (3) those perfections as applied to God 
and creatures bear only an analogical similitude to one another. In short, 
analogy is not a “merely semantic” doctrine which only tells us something 
about our modus significandi; rather, this modus significandi is proportionate 
to creaturely perfection, and thus analogia is founded in the metaphysical 
principle of non-univocal causation.
This interpretation—one that affirms all three aforementioned points 
about analogia—amounts to the position that I call the “orthodox” inter-
pretation of analogy in Aquinas. It is this position that Alston interprets 
Aquinas as adopting, but it is also the position that he rejects in the latter 
part of his essay. This rejection is based on two lines of criticism—one 
focused on the modus significandi and the other on the res significata.
With respect to the first line of criticism, Alston says the following:
Our grammatical forms make a contribution to the truth conditions of our 
statements. Thus when I say that Jim forgave Sally, part of what it takes to 
make my statement true depends on the fact that “forgave” picks out one 
attribute rather than another, and “Jim” and “Sally” are being used to refer 
to certain persons rather than others. . . . [But this means] that a condition of 
truth is that there is a distinction between Jim and this action.40
Of course, this purported truth-condition—that there is a distinction be-
tween substance and accident—cannot apply to the divine simplicity for 
reasons that we have already touched upon.41 But if this is the case, Alston 
37Alston, “Aquinas on Theological Predication,” 167. 
38Alston, “Aquinas on Theological Predication,” 167. 
39See Alston, “Aquinas on Theological Predication,” 165. 
40Alston, “Aquinas on Theological Predication,” 168. 
41See n33 above. 
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argues, then theologians literally do not have access to the truth condi-
tions of their statements about God. Of course, “if truth goes, the game is 
up with theology.”42
Anticipating a potential response on behalf of Aquinas, Alston admits 
that it would be saying too much to suggest that a “perfectly” precise gram-
matical form is a necessary condition for knowing the truth-conditions 
of any given proposition expressed in ordinary language. Noting that 
the logic of existential quantification had not yet been developed in the 
thirteenth century, Alston suggests that such an extreme position would 
commit its adherent to the view that the truth-conditions of propositions 
such as “Margaret Thatcher exists” would be out of reach for anyone who 
did not know that the “precise” grammatical form of such a statement is 
something like “There is at least one x such that x is a person and Mar-
garet Thatcher.”43 Still, Alston argues, “surely it is better to have an apt, 
perspicuous form of statement for what we want to say. This can hardly 
be denied.”44
This leads Alston to his second, “stickier” problem with Aquinas’s 
doctrine of analogia on the side of the res significata: “By [Aquinas’s] own 
admission he is in no position to spell out the respects of similiarity and 
dissimilarity between divine and human causal agency, willing, and so 
on.”45 Again, this criticism mirrors the earlier “grammatical” problem 
on the side of the modus significandi—the common issue being the lack of 
perspicuous truth conditions. The more fundamental step in Alston’s criti-
cism, however, is not so much that the Thomistic position is incoherent; 
rather, it fails to recognize the possibility of a certain kind of univocity on 
the side of the res significata. Indeed, such a possibility lies in waiting in 
another key text, I Sent. 19.5.2, in which Aquinas includes among “three 
modes of analogy” a “mode of analogical predication . . . when several 
things are put on an equal footing under one and the same common concept, 
although the nature that they share in common exists diversely in them.”46
It is Alston’s contention that Aquinas fails to exploit his own recogni-
tion in the context of his doctrine of analogia: “Why,” he asks, “should 
it impossible to form a concept of willing, knowing, forgiving, or loving 
that abstracts from the differences in the ways in which these forms are 
realized in God and creatures, and hence can be predicated univocally 
42Alston, “Aquinas on Theological Predication,” 169. 
43See Alston, “Aquinas on Theological Predication,” 170. This is an unfortunate example 
because there are actually very good reasons to think that “Margaret Thatcher exists” is not 
rendered faithfully by the tools of existential quantification, e.g., “(∃x)[Px • (x = m)].” In fact, 
I suggest that such a position is inconsistent with a Thomistic position on the semantics of 
existence. On this point, see Harris, “The Thin Theory of Existence and Conceptual Idolatry,” 
73–86. 
44Alston, “Aquinas on Theological Predication,” 170. 
45Alston, “Aquinas on Theological Predication,” 173. 
46Alston, “Aquinas on Theological Predication,” 175. 
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of both?”47 Such a rendering of the analogy between divine and crea-
turely predication would allow for some univocity, since the relevant 
dissimilarities would be subtracted from the concept in question, while 
yet preserving the obvious and considerable dissimilarities between God 
and creatures with respect to their exemplification of the perfection desig-
nated by this predicate-concept. In other words, such a perfection would 
retain a “generic,” but not a “specific,” similitude when exemplified by 
God and creatures.48
It is this univocal, generic similitude that Alston does not want to give 
up when it comes to divine naming. Therefore his most fundamental 
criticism is expressed concisely in the conclusion of his impressive essay: 
“when it comes to what Aquinas calls ‘pure perfection terms’ he lacks 
any sound reason for denying that they can be univocally applied [in the 
way described] across the divine-creature gap.”49 At day’s end, for Alston, 
Aquinas is mistaken in leaving the aforementioned special “mode” of 
analogy explained in I Sent. 19.5.2 “untapped,” as it were, for the project 
of divine naming. Aquinas’s doctrine of analogia suffers accordingly. This 
is Alston’s critique, in a nutshell.
One of the two objectives of the present essay is to provide answers 
to these criticisms offered by Alston. For the purposes of this section, 
however, we pivot to Wolterstorff, for my other objective is to show why 
Wolterstorff’s “heterodox” departure from Alston’s “orthodox” interpre-
tation of Aquinas is problematic.
In response to Alston, Wolterstorff describes his thesis in the form of 
three objectives: “[Alston’s] argument is that Aquinas sees himself as 
having to pay the price, for that position, of denying ‘straight univocity.’ 
My argument will be that Aquinas affirms both straight univocity and the 
possibility of saying of God what is literally true of him—while also af-
firming analogy.”50 The latter two of these three objectives about Aquinas 
are consistent with the abovementioned orthodox interpretation, so it is 
the first objective—that Aquinas allows for “straight univocity” between 
predicates applied to God and creatures—which serves as the differentia 
for Wolterstorff’s heterodoxy. It is this position that is most interesting for 
our current purposes.
Wolterstorff recognizes the importance of the distinction between 
modus significandi and res significata and divine simplicity with respect to 
the question of analogy. Citing Summa theologiae 1.13.5, he “tips his hand,” 
as it were, with respect to his heterodox reading: “The issue [in article 5] 
is whether the term, in these two or more uses, is being used to designate 
the same property or different properties. If the same, then it is being used 
47Alston, “Aquinas on Theological Predication,” 175. 
48In other words, Aquinas could retain precisely the sort of similitude he rejects in Summa 
theologiae 1.4.3. See n28 above. 
49Alston, “Aquinas on Theological Predication,” 178. 
50Wolterstorff, “Alston on Aquinas on Theological Predication,” 116. 
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univocally; if not, then it is being used equivocally.”51 Note the emphasis 
on the term “property”—one with no correlate in the Latin texts at issue.52 
If it is true that the res significata of perfection terms are properties, then it 
makes sense to make a clear distinction between (1) these properties them-
selves and (2) the way in which a subject bears those properties. Indeed, 
this seems to be precisely Wolterstorff’s understanding: “The res significata 
of those pure perfection terms is just those perfections themselves, not any 
particular mode of participation in the perfection. Hence such terms can 
be applied literally to God, even though our creaturely mode of participa-
tion in those perfections is different from God’s mode of participation.”53 
Therefore, Aquinas’s “serious problem” is that he fails to recognize that 
the very fact that both God and creatures share any single property at all 
(regardless of the divergent ways in which the property is exemplified) 
implies some sort of univocity.
Note the similarity to Alston’s objection to Aquinas’s refusal to grant a 
generic univocity to perfections as predicated of God and creatures.54 The 
difference is that Wolterstorff goes further, saying that Aquinas did in fact 
hold precisely this sort of position:
In assertively uttering “God is alive” and assertively uttering “Joe is alive,” 
we are predicating the same “form” of two different things. But given our 
other conviction, that God “participates” in perfections as a simple being 
whereas Joe participates in them as a complex being, we would say that we 
are claiming a different relationship to hold in the two cases—though not 
entirely different, since in both cases we can describe the subject as “partici-
pating in” what is designated by the predicate term. It’s our predicating of 
the predicate term to God that is analogous to our predicating it of Joe; the 
analogy is to be located, not in the sense (meaning) of the predicate term 
itself but in the copula. This, I submit, is what we would say if we held 
Aquinas’ ontology.55
For Wolterstorff, the dissimilarity expressed by the doctrine of analogia 
between God and creatures is a dissimilarity “in the copula,” not “of the 
predicate term itself.” That is to say, we can clearly identify the similarity 
and dissimilarity in the propositions “God is alive” and “Joe is alive”; for 
in both cases the same property of “life” is exemplified, but in different ways 
signaled by the copula of the sentence. In “God is alive,” the copula is 
identitative; in “Joe is alive,” the copula is predicative. This dissimilarity, 
of course, is due to God’s simplicity and Joe’s complexity, respectively. The 
similarity—and thus the univocity—in the two predications is supplied by 
51Wolterstorff, “Alston on Aquinas on Theological Predication,” 119–120 (my emphases). 
52For a detailed discussion of a “property-based metaphysics” and its relationship to clas-
sical theism, see Nash-Marshall, “Properties, Conflation, and Attribution,” 1–18. 
53Wolterstorff, “Alston on Aquinas on Theological Predication,” 121. 
54See n28 above. 
55Wolterstorff, “Alston on Aquinas on Theological Predication,” 126. 
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the fact that the same perfection is being exemplified in different ways; 
hence Wolterstorff’s heterodox reading of Aquinas.
Wolterstorff argues that his heterodox reading of Summa theologiae 
1.13.5 is “concealed from us by our English translations.”56 In particular, 
Wolterstorff takes issue with Herbert McCabe’s translation of the following 
from Aquinas’s response in Article 5: “Sed nullum nomen convenit Deo 
secundum illam rationem, secundum quam dicitur de creatura.”57 McCabe 
renders this sentence as follows: “But no word when used of God means 
the same as when it is used of a creature.” Wolterstorff suggests that “this 
is interpretation, not translation.”58 If it were true that no word—not even 
perfection terms—means the same when predicated of God and creatures, 
then indeed Wolterstorff’s heterodoxy would be compromised. Indeed, his 
heterodox reading relies upon the position that perfection terms identify 
identical perfections as exemplified by God and creatures.
As an alternative translation, Wolterstorff offers the following “literal 
translation”: “But no name applies to God according to the same ratio ac-
cording to which it is said of a creature.”59 Wolterstorff’s point is that the 
Latin word ratio is ambiguous, and that it is not at all clear that it should be 
rendered as “meaning.” Indeed, citing passages from Summa contra Gentiles 
I.32, Wolterstorff prefers to render ratio as “the force of the copula”; for then 
Aquinas’s (supposed) position that perfection terms designate the same 
properties exemplified differently by God and creatures is vindicated:
The “is” in “God is wise” necessarily has a different force, a different ratio, 
from the “is” in “Socrates is wise”—assuming that we are using our words 
in such a way that in each case what we say is true. But the force (ratio) of 
the copula in the two cases is not completely different and unconnected; the 
copula is not being used purely equivocally. Its force (ratio) when used to 
speak of creatures is analogical to its force (ratio) when used to speak of God; 
in both cases one is claiming some mode of participation in the perfection 
by the entity referred to.60
By translating ratio as “the force of the copula,” Wolterstorff reads Aquinas 
as keeping univocity on the side of the res significata, while acknowledging 
equivocity on the side of “the act of predicating.”61 This univocity and 
equivocity when considered together makes for the doctrine of analogia in 
Aquinas, as Wolterstorff’s heterodox reading has it.
3. A Critical Problem in Wolterstorff’s Heterodoxy
In my view, Wolterstorff’s heterodox interpretation of Aquinas on analogy 
is mistaken. The general problem with this reading is that it imports an 
56Wolterstorff, “Alston on Aquinas on Theological Predication,” 128. 
57Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1.13.5. 
58Wolterstorff, “Alston on Aquinas on Theological Predication,” 128. 
59Wolterstorff, “Alston on Aquinas on Theological Predication,” 128. 
60Wolterstorff, “Alston on Aquinas on Theological Predication,” 126–27. 
61Wolterstorff, “Alston on Aquinas on Theological Predication,” 130. 
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alien understanding of “properties” into Aquinas’s texts. With Siobhan 
Nash-Marshall, I take it that such an understanding of properties includes 
at least the following commitment: namely, that “properties are basic and 
invariant features of reality.”62 That is to say, separate instances of predi-
cates such as “good” denote a single, identical feature of reality—even 
when this feature of reality is “instantiated in” or “participated by” in God 
and creatures, respectively. As Wolterstorff puts the matter, Aquinas “is 
not saying that the terms predicated have a different sense. . . . [T]he thing 
designated (signified) is exactly the same.”63 Now it is true that Wolter-
storff has been an important advocate for medieval exponents of divine 
simplicity, for example, in the sense that he has dedicated tremendous 
scholarly energy to encouraging contemporary analytic philosophers 
to understand medieval thinkers on their own terms.64 Despite this, 
Wolterstorff assumes a property-based metaphysics when interpreting 
Aquinas—one that is foreign to Aquinas’s own thought. In order to see 
what this means, we can consider two especially notable “symptoms” that 
are intelligible in light of this commitment.
Now we have seen that Wolterstorff’s reading of Aquinas depends 
heavily upon his commitment to the idea that perfections themselves and 
the mode of exemplifying those perfections must be kept distinct. Without 
a clear distinction here, there can be no distinction between the “force” of 
the copula (Wolterstorff’s translation of ratio in Summa theologiae 1.13.5) 
and the perfection terms at issue in divine naming. Yet, while the dis-
tinction itself is well-founded, the way in which Wolterstorff makes the 
distinction is deeply problematic, from a Thomistic point of view. For 
example, in an abovementioned quotation, Wolterstorff says that “God 
‘participates’ in perfections as a simple being whereas Joe participates in 
them as a complex being.”65 Indeed, for Wolterstoff, these two modes of 
“participation” account for the difference in meaning in the copula in the 
propositions “God is alive” and “Joe is alive.”
The confusion here is evident when we consider the meaning of 
“participation”; for the very notion of participation in Aquinas implies 
an asymmetrical relation of effect to cause. That is, effects participate in 
causes; causes are participated by effects. Because God is the first cause of 
all created being, all created being participates in him.66 Crucially, precisely 
62Nash-Marshall, “Properties, Conflation, and Attribution,” 2. 
63Wolterstorff, “Alston on Aquinas on Theological Predication,” 125. Perhaps not co-
incidentally, Wolterstorff’s “property-based” reading of Aquinas is strikingly similar to a 
position articulated in the Epilogue of his 1970 book On Universals: “Everything whatsoever 
is either a predicable, a case of a predicable, or an exemplification of a predicable. . . . God too 
has properties; he too acts. So, he too exemplifies predicables” (Wolterstorff, On Universals, 
299). I am grateful to Professors Lambert Zuidervaart and Robert Sweetman for their respec-
tive observations of this fact. 
64See, for example, Wolterstorff, “Divine Simplicity,” 547. 
65See n53 above. 
66“It must be said that every being in any way existing is from God [a Deo esse]. For what-
ever is found in anything by participation, must be caused in it by that to which it belongs 
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because God is uncaused, he does not participate in anything—not even him-
self.67 The very notion of participation includes metaphysical posteriority, 
inferiority and finitude, none of which apply properly to God.
But could not even this disparity of meaning be attributed to “mere 
semantics,” especially given the fact that for Aquinas God surely does 
“have” perfections (i.e., by being identical with them) in an entirely dif-
ferent manner than creatures have them (i.e., as qualities)? Not quite. The 
problem remains when we consider Wolterstorff’s rationale for saying that 
God participates in properties. Wolterstorff’s rationale for saying that God 
participates in properties, albeit in a different way than creatures, is that 
he wants to show that the properties themselves are the same in God and 
creatures. But for Aquinas, created perfections exist as participations of 
the divine essence. In other words, for created perfections, “to be” and “to 
participate” are one and the same.68 This is just what it means be the effect 
of a non-univocal agent. There cannot be univocity between divine and 
creaturely perfections, therefore, because the very notion of participation 
implies a non-identity with that which is participated.
This non-identity between divine and created perfections is not some-
thing that a property-based metaphysics can accommodate, because 
again the distinctive commitment of property-based metaphysics is that 
properties are “invariant features of reality.” Wolterstorff’s mistaken 
position that Aquinas says that God participates in properties, then, is 
symptomatic of this commitment to properties as “invariant”—one that 
is wholly alien to the framework of non-univocal causality in Aquinas. 
Created perfections are distinct from uncreated perfections just to the 
extent that creatures are distinct from God. This is the case, of course, 
because “uncreated perfections” are nothing other than the divine es-
sence itself.
The second “symptom” of Wolterstorff’s anachronistic reading of 
Aquinas is intimately related to the first. As Alston recognizes in his 
response,69 this symptom is Wolterstorff’s neglect of the modus significandi 
when it comes to understanding (and translating) what Aquinas means by 
ratio in Summa theologiae 1.13.5. Whereas the McCabe translation translates 
ratio as “meaning,” we have seen that it is crucial to Wolterstorff’s inter-
pretation that ratio designates only “the force of the copula.” However, in 
the response of Article 4 of Question 13, Aquinas tells a different story: 
“For the ratio signified by the name is the conception in the intellect of the 
thing signified by the name. But our intellect, since it knows God from 
essentially, as iron becomes ignited by fire.” Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1.44.1. 
67“Now the first good and the best—God—is not a participated good, because the essen-
tial good is prior to the participated good.” Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1.3.2. 
68Indeed, for Aquinas, esse is the perfection of perfections: “Now all created perfections 
are included in the perfection of being; for things are perfect, precisely so far as they have 
being after some fashion.” Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1.4.2. 
69See Alston, “Response to Wolterstorff,” 235. 
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creatures, in order to understand God, forms conceptions proportional to 
the perfections flowing from God to creatures.”70
Clearly, the ratio that Aquinas has in mind is the aforementioned con-
cept from the Aristotelian semantic triangle. The point is simple: words 
can only signify things via the mediating presence of concepts, and thus 
only things proportionate to those concepts can be signified adequately. 
Because God’s perfections are identical with his essence, they resist the 
conceptual representation that is proper to our intellectual capacities. Our 
language about God is always analogical, therefore, insofar as human in-
tellects come to the judgment (not a conceptual refinement) “that claims 
a truth about the holy darkness of God which transcends anything the 
concept can quidditatively grasp on its own, bound as it is to creatures. . . . 
There is no univocal core to the concept that has been abstracted from its 
finite and infinite modes.”71
In eliding the importance of the modus significandi in Aquinas’s Aristo-
telian semantics, Wolterstorff inadvertently smuggles in a property-based 
metaphysics that is wholly foreign to Aquinas’s own metaphysical 
project. No wonder Aquinas remarks that according to the opinio Platonis, 
“there is no need for an active intellect in order to make things actually 
intelligible,”72 since it is precisely this activity of concept formation (the 
fruit of the active intellect) that a Platonist account of “properties” does 
not need. Indeed, by banishing the modus significandi from any functional 
role in his reading of Aquinas on analogy, Wolterstorff seems to banish 
Aquinas’s own Aristotelian semantics.
I have attempted to demonstrate that Alston’s orthodox reading of 
Aquinas is much more faithful to the letter of the Latin Doctor’s text than 
that of Wolterstorff’s heterodox interpretation. As we have seen, this 
discrepancy has to do with a certain property-based metaphysics that 
Wolterstorff anachronistically reads into the texts of Aquinas—one that 
fails to account for (1) the non-identity of divine and creaturely perfec-
tions as cause and effect, respectively, of non-univocal agency; and (2) the 
role of the modus significandi in the doctrine of divine names. Having vin-
dicated Alston’s interpretive project to some extent, then, we now turn to 
his criticisms, offering some responses on behalf of Aquinas.
4. Reply to Alston’s Criticisms
We have seen that Alston raises two main objections to Aquinas’s doctrine 
of analogy: (1) due to the finite nature of our modus significandi, we seem 
not to have access to the truth conditions of propositions about God.73 (2) 
Aquinas fails to exploit a distinction made in I Sent. 19.5.2—one that could 
70Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1.13.4. 
71Rocca, “The Distinction between Res Significata and Modus Significandi in Aquinas’s 
Theological Epistemology,” 194. 
72Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1.79.3. 
73See n45 above. 
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yield a generic univocity in divine naming.74 To be precise, then, I should 
say that my responses are direct answers to these particular concerns. 
With respect to (1), I will attempt to show that there is indeed a way to 
preserve the truth conditions of propositions about God despite the fact 
that our modus significandi cannot represent God as he is in himself (i.e., 
simple). With respect to (2), I will attempt to show that Aquinas has very 
good reason even in the text mentioned not to ascribe the sort of univocity 
that Alston claims is freely available on Aquinas’s own terms.
In criticism (1), Alston remarks that “none of the statements we make 
about God can be (wholly) true. For a necessary condition of the truth of 
[statements] is that what we are asserting of God is related to him in a 
certain way, and hence is distinguishable from him.”75 In response, I offer 
two qualifications—one general, and the other specific.
The general point is that Alston seems to take it as a given that truth is 
a univocal predicate which either applies to statements or fails to apply 
to them. For Aquinas, however, truth is far from a univocal predicate; for, 
like unity and goodness, it is a transcendental perfection that is realized 
“wholly” (so to speak) only in God.76 In order to understand the way in 
which Aquinas understands our ability to form true propositions about 
God, then, we have to understand this exercise performatively. Crucially, 
the relation between intellect and thing is a relation of conformity, not one-
to-one correspondence, as is often the case in modern correspondence 
theories.77 If it is Alston’s contention that Aquinas’s doctrine of analogy does 
not make sense in light of modern correspondence theories of truth, then 
he is right. But this is no vice; for there is good reason to view modern corre-
spondence theories of truth as problematic, at least from a Thomistic point 
of view.
When we think of propositions as signs of an intellect come to frui-
tion in the act of self-reflective judgment rather than as “abstract objects” 
in their own right, we are closer to Aquinas’s understanding of truth-
bearers. In short, it is the intellect-in-act, not an abstract object called a 
“proposition,” of which truth is properly predicated in Aquinas.78 When 
this general point is understood, it is easier to understand how our modus 
significandi can yet form “true” propositions about God without claiming 
to have comprehended the divine essence in his simplicity. Because truth 
is an analogical perfection itself, it should come as no surprise that we 
should be able to say that our intellects are true just to the limited extent 
that we are able to understand created perfections as pointing to divine 
74See n47 above. 
75Alston, “Aquinas on Theological Predication,” 168–169. 
76See Summa theologiae 1.16.5; Summa contra Gentiles I.47.6; De veritate 1.4.
77On this point, see Harris, “Does Aquinas Hold a Correspondence Theory of Truth in De 
Veritate?,” 291.
78On this point, see O’Callaghan, Thomist Realism and the Linguistic Turn: Toward a More 
Perfect Form of Existence, 168. 
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perfections by way of their non-univocal similitude. It is Gottlob Frege, not 
Thomas Aquinas, who holds that truth does not “tolerate more or less.”79
But this general point can be supplemented by a more specific point 
about our modus significandi and its relation to the res significata. Re-
sponding to an objector who more or less anticipates Alston’s objection 
about the failure of our modus significandi to understand God “otherwise 
than [he] is,” Aquinas says the following:
This proposition, “The intellect understanding anything otherwise than it is, 
is false,” can be taken in two senses, accordingly as this adverb “otherwise” 
determines the word “understanding” on the part of the thing understood, 
or on the part of the one who understands. Taken as referring to the thing 
understood, the proposition is true, and the meaning is: Any intellect which 
understands that the thing is otherwise than it is, is false. But this does not 
hold in the present case; because our intellect, when forming a proposition 
about God, does not affirm that He is composite, but that He is simple. But 
taken as referring to the one who understands, the proposition is false. For 
the mode of the intellect in understanding is different from the mode of the 
thing in its essence. Since it is clear that our intellect understands material 
things below itself in an immaterial manner; not that it understands them to 
be immaterial things; but its manner of understanding is immaterial. Like-
wise, when it understands simple things above itself, it understands them 
according to its own mode, which is in a composite manner; yet not so as to 
understand them to be composite things. And thus our intellect is not false 
in forming composition in its ideas concerning God.80
In other words, if we were to assert of God himself that he is composite, 
our intellects would be false; for this is to understand the thing as otherwise 
than it is. However, when we truly assert that God is simple—inevitably 
doing so by way of a modus significandi that involves composition—what 
we are doing is coming to the judgment that our act of intellection falls 
short of representing God as he is in himself. Now, in a sense, Aquinas 
agrees with Alston that such propositions cannot be wholly adequate; 
for a proposition to be wholly adequate would mean (per impossibile in 
this life) perfect conformity of the human intellect to the divine essence. 
Importantly, though, to fail to be wholly adequate, however, is not to be 
false necessarily. We do not think that propositions about stones are false 
because the propositions themselves do not share a “stony” material 
constitution; nor should we think that propositions about God are false 
because God’s being is not propositional in structure.
But this brings us to Alston’s second, more serious objection (2)—that 
Aquinas fails to appropriate the relative univocity to God and creatures 
that is freely available in I Sent. 19.5.2. In order to understand and answer 
this objection, it behooves us to examine the text in its broader context. Fit-
tingly, the question at issue in this article is “whether all things are true by 
79See Frege, “The Thought,” 291.
80Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1.13.12.
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the uncreated Truth.”81 Answering an objector who suggests that all truths 
are indeed true by direct reference to God, who is Truth itself, Aquinas 
qualifies his negative response by appealing to three ways in which a term 
can be predicated analogically—two of which (the second and third) are 
immediately relevant for our purposes of divine naming. These two kinds 
of analogy are: “[a] According to being and not according to intention; . . . 
and [b] According to intention and according to being.”82
Now Aquinas’s example of the “second mode” (a) is the way in which 
“body” is predicated of heavenly (i.e., incorruptible) and earthly (i.e., cor-
ruptible) matter-form composites. “The logician,” Aquinas argues, “who 
considers intentions only, says that the term body is univocally predicated 
of all bodies.”83 The point here is that it is possible to arrive upon univocal 
concepts that map onto two very different kinds of thing. This is possible 
because the relevant concept of body (i.e., a matter-form composite) “ab-
stracts from the difference between corruptible and incorruptible bodies” 
by way of subtraction.84 Even fundamental differences can be abstracted in 
this way, thereby maintaining univocity at the level of the concept. Given 
that this is the case in Aquinas’s own words, Alston asks, “Why . . . should 
it be impossible to form a concept of willing, knowing, forgiving, or loving 
that abstracts from the differences in the ways in which these forms are 
realized in God and creatures, and hence can be predicated univocally 
of both?”85
While Alston appeals to the second mode in order to pose this objection 
to Aquinas, Aquinas himself describes a third mode, which is the mode 
that pertains especially to perfections exemplified by God and creatures. 
Aquinas’s examples of the “third mode” of analogy [b] are “’being’ [as] 
predicated of substances and accidents . . . [and] truth and goodness and 
all like concepts [as] predicated analogously of God and creatures.”86 What 
is most important for the immediate purposes of answering Alston’s ques-
tion is that Aquinas reserves the third mode of analogy—according to both 
intention and being—for perfection terms predicated of God and creatures. 
But why this reservation? At least two reasons are immediately relevant.
The first reason is that perfection terms do not designate discrete es-
sences that are composed of genus and difference, as is the case for 
predicates such as “human,” for example, which for Aquinas is a com-
posite of genus (“animal”) and specific difference (“rational”). Indeed, in a 
81Aquinas, I Sent. 19.5.2, quaestio. 
82Aquinas, I Sent. 19.5.2, ad 1.
83Aquinas, I Sent. 19.5.2, ad 1.
84Alston, “Aquinas on Theological Predication,” 175. 
85Alston, “Aquinas on Theological Predication,” 175. Alston cites Duns Scotus in sup-
port of this position. For a comparison of Scotus and Aquinas on the subject of analogia, see 
Sweetman, “Univocity, Analogy, and the Mystery of Being According to John Duns Scotus,” 
73–87. It is important to note that even Scotus’s position on the “univocity of being” posits an 
infinite modal interval between ens creatum and ens increatum. 
86I Sent. 19.5.2, ad 1. 
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sense, every perfection is ultimately “convertible with being” in the sense 
that perfections are ultimately identical with the God who is ipsum esse 
subsistens.87 As Alston recognizes earlier in his essay, this is one of the im-
plications of Aquinas’s doctrine of so-called “transcendental” predicates, 
which are labelled as such because they “span across” all of the Aristote-
lian categories of being.88
What this means is that “being” (and also whatever is convertible with 
being) cannot be a generic concept which is amenable to the kind of “ad-
dition and subtraction” that is proper to such concepts. This is because 
generic concepts are externally differentiated by specific differences that 
do not themselves “fall under” such generic concepts. In the case of the 
generic concept “body,” the specific difference separating earthly and 
heavenly bodies is the attribute “corruptible.” But notice that the attribute 
“corruptible” is not itself a body. Indeed, precisely because corruptibility 
does not itself fall under the genus of body, it can serve as a specific dif-
ference rather than just another species. Thus, the generic univocity of 
bodiliness can be salvaged in the case of earthly and heavenly bodies. This 
generic univocity is proper to the “second mode” of analogy described in 
I Sent. 19.5.2 ad 1.
The reason that this generic univocity cannot be salvaged in transcen-
dental perfections is because transcendental perfections span across the 
entirety of being, thereby “leaving no room” for external differentia-
tion. That is to say, being cannot be a genus because there are no specific 
differences that fall outside of being.89 This is why there can be no uni-
vocity—not even the thinnest generic univocity—salvaged in the “third 
mode” of analogy described in the same passage.
The second reason that there can be no generic univocity between per-
fection terms as predicated of God and creature is closely related to the 
first, and it has to do with the sort of non-univocal agency that is appli-
cable to God in Summa theologiae 1.4.3. Returning full circle to our initial 
discussion of Aquinas’s doctrine of non-univocal agency,90 Aquinas’s met-
aphor of the sun is not quite adequate for illuminating the way in which 
creatures bear a similitude to God. Although the sun metaphor is helpful 
for showing how an agent cause can communicate itself to its effects in a 
non-specific manner, it is inadequate insofar as it cannot help but resort 
to generic similitude when accounting for the (positive) sense in which 
creatures are like God.
Unlike the Creator-creature relationship, the sun-earthly creatures rela-
tionship is a relation of distinct bearers of “heat.” While of course it is true 
that the sun is indeed the source of heat and creatures only sharers in heat, 
87See Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1.4.2. 
88See De veritate 1.1. For a magisterial treatment of Aquinas’s doctrine of transcendental 
notions, see Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals. 
89On this point, see Aristotle, Metaphysics, 998b. 
90See nn24–26 above. 
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it is nonetheless true that heat is generically common to both the sun and 
the earthly creatures it generates. This is not the case for God; for because 
being and all other perfections are not themselves generic attributes, God 
cannot be the “principle” of the genus of being in the way that the sun is the 
principle of the generic attribute of heat. Hence, Aquinas’s aforementioned 
qualification: “if there is an agent not contained in any ‘genus,’ its effect 
will still more distantly reproduce the form of the agent, not, that is, so 
as to participate in the likeness of the agent’s form according to the same 
specific or generic formality, but only according to some sort of analogy; 
as existence is common to all.”91 Alston’s suggestion that Aquinas should 
admit a generic univocity between God and creatures is undermined by the 
fact that on Aquinas’s view perfections cannot be generic attributes at all.
Unlike Wolterstorff, then, Alston appreciates the radicality of Aquinas’s 
position with respect to the res significata of perfection terms, but fails to 
take the “final step” of recognizing the full significance of their resistance 
to even generic univocity. As another Latin writer pithily put it, “si com-
prehendis, non est Deus.”92
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